EE#21 £28bn - the Coroner's Report
Lobbyists failed to respond to early symptoms that could've prevented it's demise
While it may not be boosting the economy in the way it expected, Labour’s Green Prosperity Pledge has provided significant economic stimulus. The column inches of its prognosis and subsequent obituaries single-handedly kept many journalists in business.
You would expect a similar impact on public affairs. Lobbyists love to fill a vacuum, and the one left by Labour’s decision-making process was Kola Superdeep. Yet, the GPP showed an immunity to lobbying. No civil society group or business wanted it to go, it was instead, a collective failure to stop its demise. Why? Four things stand out.
Policy consistency is not an outcome. Any meeting with the private sector at the moment comes out with the same ask, we just want certainty. It's not even conscious, it’s a corporate affairs reflex borne from the post-Brexit years. But there are two kinds of consistency. Industry does not want things to carry on as they are, otherwise they wouldn’t be complaining about high energy prices or a lack of grid connections. The public certainly doesn’t either. That means change is required. Change that Labour promised with the GPP. Rather than say, great, thanks, excellent idea, here’s the detail we think would help, but please stick with it, the GPP was warmly received and then set aside.
A single imperfect goal is better than many. Policy consistency is easier when policies have a single goal. The GPP was at various times: a net zero tool, a growth strategy, a jobs plan, and an energy security plan. Lobbyists let themselves be shaped by a changing environment, jobs worked well in Covid, growth the year after and security when Russia invaded Ukraine. That matters, because ways of spending the GPP will hit those goals differently. Spending on decarbonisation probably means consumer support for EVs and heat pumps, whereas growth could target better transport or broadband connections. But we let narrative shape policy, not the other way around.
Tangibility and detail matter. Without a single goal, and a consistent narrative, it’s hard to make a plan real to the public. This was the single biggest issue in focus groups and polling, people liked the idea in concept but either hadn’t heard of it or knew what it would mean in practice. Lobbyists didn’t help Labour transfer long-term goals into year one reality. No one ever got to what the GPP would look like on a pledge card. We knew what it could do, many organisations praised its potential to leverage private finance. But without the detail of how much, where, from who, warm praise and potential are easy to dismiss. Instead, we led with a price tag, without ever selling the goods. If business or civil society want the National Wealth Fund or GB Energy to succeed and move beyond the amount they cost (not least be able to plan for their existence), engage in the details.
Concerns were left unaddressed. From the outset, the GPP posed a challenge. It was Labour’s central spending pledge, but it didn’t clearly serve many shadow teams. That created resentment, and little external focus was given to Shadow Teams who weren’t invested in the policy. Bridget Philippson should’ve been banging Reeves’ door down for the money to go to skills not just physical capital. Wes Streeting could’ve got a public health prevention programme from better homes and more green space. They needed the support or information to show it was in their interest.
The biggest concern though was borrowing. Not just any borrowing, Labour Party borrowing. Now, there is a growing body of evidence that borrowing is less of an issue than it was:
The public recognises that change is needed, and that change costs money. They see the impact of low spending every day. This is tied to wider feelings of insecurity not just fear of debt.
Voters saw in Covid that when the Government wants to do something it can.
Memories of Liam Byrne’s infamous note are fading into the background.
However, if you were forged in the crucible of 1992, 1997 or the 2010s, you will have a deeply ingrained fear of Labour Borrowing. As interest rates rose we failed to engage those wavering early enough. We focused a lot on the need to borrow, or the space to borrow, which felt like dismissing worriers’ concerns, rather than focus on how borrowing is less of a political risk.
Prevention is better than treatment
Parts of Labour had been asking for all of this since before the policy was launched, but they didn’t get the support early enough. Instead, there was a flurry of activity at the end when the policy was already on life support. This only had the effect of prolonging an SW1 story about the death of a number. Without any hinterland on the detail, lobbyists could only ever administer palliative care for the GPP rather than prevent or even cure its terminal disease.
Last week’s announcement brought significant wins (hello £8.3 billion to GB Energy). But I, like others, worry that Labour has lost a central plank of its offer. It’s going to be hard work to counter growing brand perceptions in the public of a lack of conviction. But the grief for that cannot be laid solely at the feet of the party. Charities, businesses, unions*, think-tanks, all of us need to own a share the blame.
*NB: I’ve been fascinated by the response of the Unions to the GPP and is hike in the windfall tax. More on this soon.